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Steven R. McKenna

Tragedy and the Consolation of Myth
in Henryson's Fables

Henryson' s notions of tragedy in the Fables reflect a dual perspective.
From one point of view, which I will call the choric and which is associated
with Henryson's narrative voice, the obscure, confusing, capricious, and arbitrary inner workings of tragedy are given meaning by being placed within
the context of religious and cultural mythic systems. From the other point of
view, that of the tragic figure, the inner workings of tragic action reveal
themselves to be logical, orderly, and meaningful regardless of any superimposed mythic systems. 1 What I propose to do here is view several of Henryson's fables in terms of their tragic dimension.
First of all, an essential characteristic of any tragedy, and a characteristic
that is present in many of the fables, is the issue of a tragic character's discovering some essential truth, of achieving some growth in self-understanding. The nut metaphor by which Henryson in his Prologue characterizes the
deeper meanings of a fable can likewise serve as a metaphor for this particular aspect of tragedy. Just as a fable is a riddle whose meanings must be
sought like the meat of a nut, so too the deep and obscure truths about human
identity and the human condition are a riddle, the solution of which lies in
the power of the tragic figure.

ITbese are issues which achieve their fullest development in Heruyson's "Testament of
Cresseid,' as I've shown in a forthcoming article in Scottish Literary Journal, particularly in
the contrast between her self-understanding and the vision of her we get through the Narrator's commentary.
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This issue is raised poignantly in a fable that can be seen as truly tragic,
namely "The Wolf and the Wether." Here, the Wether's desire to protect the
flock from the depredations of the foxes and wolves is potentially a noble,
indeed even heroic, characteristic. Yet this characteristic is balanced by the
Wether's desire not merel~ to protect the flock, but also to hound the Wolf
into a state of utter terror. The Wether both literally and figuratively oversteps his bounds, and we may see this as indicative of a tragic excess in his
character. When the Wether's dog skin rips off on the bush as he pursues
the Wolf, the Wether must then painfully confront the limits and realities of
his own character and the results of attempting to exceed those limits. He
must finally acknowledge who and what he really is. His excuses made to
the Wolf upon being exposed sound pitiful and cowardly, but they could
nonetheless be true. When, for instance, he says he never meant to do the
Wolf any harm (ll. 2558 & 2575) he is probably being sincere insofar as he
implies physical harm rather than the Wolf's deep-felt terror. Consider the
absurdity of a sheep chasing a wolf: had he ever managed to catch the Wolf,
the Wether at that point would have been utterly helpless in his victory, and
quite likely dead, just as he is when he loses his disguise.
The question of identity brings up a fundamental point about the structure of tragic action as Henryson constructs it. The changes of fortune that
many of the animals experience, such as the Wether's fall, can be plotted
along the traditional lines of tragic action: after the exposition the action
rises to a climax or crisis and then falls to a catastrophe. Yet when we view
the animals as the allegorical representations of humanity, as the poet and the
fable conventions encourage us to do, we can see that a tragic catastrophe for
humanity has already occurred-namely that the tragic human condition is
inextricably linked in the poet's mind with the fallen human condition (as deimed in the context of Christianity). 3 In general, then, Henryson' s fables
can be viewed in terms of rising action, not falling action, leading to climaxes that, if not tragic per se, in many cases carry tragic overtones. The
rising action of these fables thus clarifies and illuminates the nature of the
original catastrophe vis-a-vis human identity, that is, the original act which
resulted in the present bleakness of the human condition.

2ef. t. 2535. All references to Henryson's poetry are from The Poems and Fables of
Robert Henryson, ed. Denton Fox (Oxford, 1981). Hereafter all quotations will be cited
parenthetically within the text.
3George Peek, in his "Henryson's View of Original Sin in 'The Bludy Serk, SSL, 10
(1972), 199-206, points out that original sin is a condition of fallen man for which we are
not guilty, but is the burden which we must all bear. This notion is equally applicable to the
Fables and the initial condition which the tragic action illuminates.
O.
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Specifically, we can point to the omnipresent theme of carnality in the
Fables, for in Henryson! s view carnality makes humanity bestial. We might
even say that human carnality is a condition which leads people to tragic errors of judgment and more importantly reflects the essential criminality of
tragic figures. And, significantly, "criminality" can only exist within the
context of cultural and religious values that define right and wrong. Take,
for instance, the frrst fable, "The Cock and the Jasp." Here the Cock's preference for food instead of the jewel is framed by the tale and its moralitas in
terms of carnality as opposed to reason. Implicit in the Cock's attitude is the
idea that we as human beings are prisoners of our own inescapable limitations of desire, reason and spirit. The mind and soul are in this sense fettered by the body and its needs. Rather than embodying pride, traditionally
associated with cocks and the fIrst of the seven deadly sins in the Gregorian
order, the Cock of this fIrSt fable seems to reflect gluttony, being as he is so
concerned with the dictates of his belly. Significantly, the Cassianic, as opposed to the Gregorian, order of the seven deadly sins places gluttony and
lechery (not pride) fIrst because as the theologian Cassian argued those two
needs were the most difficult to overcome since they were the two sins most
closely related to the necessary human functions upon which survival
depends-eating and procreating. The Cock's crime here, according to the
Narrator, is thus his failure to live up to the spiritual and moral ideals of the
Narrator's contextual Christian mythic system, governed as the Cock is by
the physical necessities of his own flesh. Making the allegorical leap to the
human realm, Henryson's attitude on this point is clearly and succinctly expressed in the Prologue:
Na meruell is, ane man be lyke ane beist,
Quhilk Iufis ay carnall and foull delyte,
That schame can not him ren3e nor arreist,
Bot takis all the lust and appetyte,
Quhilk throw custum and the daylie ryte
Syne in the mynd sa fast is radicate
That he in brutal beist is transformate.
(ll. 50-56)

This theme appears frequently in the Fables. For instance, in "The Fox, the
Wolf, and the Cadger" the Fox appeals to the Wolf's greed, gluttony and
sloth in the scheme to steal the Cadger's fish. But more to the point, the fIrSt
truly "tragic" fable, "The Fox and the Wolf," has within it a succinct explanation of the tragic human condition as Henryson envisions it and as articulated by his narrator: "neid may haif na law" (1. 731). The tragic condition
for the Fox, and for humanity, is that the body and soul have different, competing, and ultimately irreconcilable needs. In the mortal realm, as Hen-
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ryson presents it, the body usually wins out because of carnal, bestial, and
biological necessity, and through this victory, when seen from the Christian
perspective of the "law," the soul comes out the loser. This so-called need
and its dominance over the soul represents for Henryson the essential criminality of the tragic figure and his condition, for without the overarching
Christian mythos there can be no tragedy or tragic dimension. The tragic
action must take place in relation to some infraction of cultural or cosmic
rules.
Furthermore, the "need" as Henryson envisions it decidedly does not
make of the human being a passive, suffering victim of powers beyond mortal control. To the contrary, the implications of many of the fables' morals
are that humanity exercises poor judgment, blinded as we are in our fallen
state by cotpOral concerns. Yet for Henryson the essential tragic dimension
of this state of affairs is not so much the stock commonplace of traditional
views of tragedy, that is tragedy being brought about by some fundamental
error of judgment, though for him error certainly plays a crucial role.
Rather, the Christian mythological context which frames the fables indicates
that the tragic dimension of the human condition is ultimately associated with
cognition, volition and guilt. Error of judgment, like sin itself, results from
willful action and leads to consequences. As an example, we can look at the
Fox in "The Fox and the Wolf." In this fable the Fox reads his destiny in
the stars. For him Nature in its cosmic dimension offers a guide, even a
caveat of sorts. But in the end he brings destruction down upon himself by
stealing the kid and incurring the punishment and retribution of the goatherd.
This criminality exists independent of the astrological messages of the stars
and planets. It comes about through the dictates of the Fox's character-that
need in the Fox which makes him unwilling and unable to foreswear flesh.
Presented with the law on one hand (the Wolf's administered penance to the
Fox requiring him to fast on fish until Easter), and on the other hand the biological need of having to eat flesh, the Fox chooses to cater to his need.
Hence, such behavior, when viewed from the Christian perspective, carries
culpability and therefore punishment. The biological need may seem to imply a lack of control, but the message of the moral is that the animals, and by
extension humanity, do exercise ultimate control over their fates.
Here we must consider the role of the Narrator in the fables, since he
functions as a choric voice which articulates the governing moral and ethical
principles. As such, the Narrator can be seen to function as the voice of collective humanity speaking to collective humanity. The Narrator becomes
both an idealized audience and a pointedly moral commentator on the action
which he describes. Take, for instance, "The Cock and the Jasp" again. The
Narrator's moralitas superimposes a socio-religious ideal of knowledge and
wisdom upon the Cock's rejection of the gem. This superimposition gives
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the fable it's meaning for the Narrator and in doing so points to the Cock's
essential criminality. From the Narrator's perspective, the Cock's action
represents a serious error of judgment, a grave mistake, one that is worthy of
at least a serious moral reproach. But from the Cock's perspective, his rejection of the jewel is logical: he sees no intellectual or cosmic significance
in the stone and is correct, in light of the biological need, in seeking instead
scraps of com and other morsels.
A key characteristic of the Narrator is his tendency to shun the criminality of the animal figures in the fables. If we look at the fable of "The Fox
and the Wolf" as an example here we see in the moralitas that the Narrator,
by assuming a religious perspective, can't accept the Fox's criminality or its
biological basis, but instead exhorts folk to mend their sinful ways and not
make false confessions. This particular moral clearly implies that tragedy,
through the example of the deceased Fox, can serve an idealized, prophetic
function-namely that there is a human capacity to discover profound truths
about the self and one's fate and to act upon these truths. However, this
utopian element of tragedy is counterbalanced and neutralized by the Narrator's own attitude and function. Whatever profound truths the tragic figure
fmds, whatever visionary truths are discovered are doomed to remain hidden,
secret and solitary with the tragic figure. On the one hand the fables point to
the tragic necessity of violating the cultural and religious myths (upon which
the Narrator ultimately relies for his meanings) in order to reach the great insights into the workings of fate, truth, and identity. Yet on the other hand
the Narrator counsels vehemently against people engaging in this tragically
necessary action. As the Narrator says in his prologue to "The Preaching of
the Swallow, "
Nane suld presume be ressoun naturall
To seirche the secreitis off the Trinitie,
Bot trow fermelie and lat all ressoun be.
(11. 1647-9)

Neither human reason nor action should, in his view, aspire to divine wisdom in any way; and since we are assumed to be created in God's "image,"
this call is in effect a taboo against knowing who we are. For the Narrator,
God is incomprehensible, and by extension so are we. The human mind
should content itself with the more limited knowledge that God, as perceived
through His creations (11. 1650-52), is at least "gude, fair, wyis, and bening." Yet it is, after all, a profound glimpse of some fundamental truth that
the little birds implicitly see in their collective downfall and ruin-a glimpse
that the Narrator believes is best avoided.
The Narrator's attitude indicates that for the choric mind nature and the
cosmos embody the signs, symbols and guides whereby human beings can

The Consolation of Myth in Henryson IS Fables 495

come to at least a rough understanding of their place in the grand scheme of
things. If God is partially knowable through His creations, then we can
know our place in the hierarchy of the universe and through this understanding also come to know something of ourselves. This optimistic, choric attitude ignores the question of evil, however, especially in light of the bleakness of so many of the other fables where error and wrongdoing abound. In
fact, this optimistic, idealistic stance taken by the Narrator is not even borne
out by the fable itself. The little birds, when viewed in light of the tragic
characteristics that I've outlined here, do not and cannot orient themselves in
relation to Nature and God as the Narrator implies is possible in his prologue. The birds don't read Nature as do the Narrator and the Swallow.
This fable, broadly speaking, echoes Henryson's general theme of reason
versus carnality, of need having no law. The Swallow believes in fate as it
reads the signs of its environment; it believes that the birds will surely be the
victims of their own short-sightedness. For this reason the Swallow advises
action, but the other birds won't listen. We might well say that the birds suffer and die because of their own action of inaction, and this points back to
the essential criminality and culpability of the tragic figure. Like the prophet
Tiresias, the Swallow and its "truth" go unheeded. The birds must learn the
painful truth of reality for themselves, a truth that the Swallow's cautionary
voice tries to prevent the birds from learning. As Daniel Murtaugh has noted
of "The Preaching of the Swallow," "what the moralitas leaves out in its account of the fable [is] the surprised pain of the discovery of just how dark the
workings of Providence must seem to us here below ... 4 Indeed, the choric
collectivity of the Narrator (and his mouthpiece the Swallow) keeps the tragic
truth distant, dark, and secret. Implicit in the fable is a warning to humanity
to avoid the action taken by the birds in order to avoid the tragedy that befell
them. Furthermore, Henryson's Narrator and his surrogate the Swallow seek
to order and make sense of the horrors of reality by superimposing a mythic
dimension which keeps that existential despair and senseless cruelty at bay.
If we tum here to "The Two Mice," we can see a similar reliance on
mythic consolation at work. The Country Mouse is a thief, as is her sister
the Town Mouse, but in the moralitas the Country Mouse's way of life is
praised while that of the Town Mouse is condemned. The moral is strictly
biblical but doesn't necessarily follow from the experience of the Burgess
Mouse herself. She is quite at home with the abundance of city life and its
inherent hazards. The Country Mouse suffers because she is out of place in
the town. The biblical mythos of the moral thus gives meaning and a higher
value to her rural experiences and the bareness of that existence. Though the
4Daniel M. Murtaugh, "Heruyson's Animals,' Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 14 (1972), 409.
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Country Mouse cannot be considered a tragic figure, since she does not die
and ultimately embodies the humble life that the choric Narrator fmds so
meaningful in his moralitas, nevertheless the fable does imply the possibility
of a tragic view of reality. Despite the Narrator's attempt to elevate the significance of the Cat to cosmic and mythic proportions (the Cat being implicitly an embodiment of Death and fatal destiny), in the fable it "remains a
playful household pet. .. 5 Had the Country Mouse been killed by the Cat, her
death would have been meaningless unless, of course, the choric Narrator
placed that death in some sort of context, such as Christian values. Yet
what the Country Mouse learns through her city experience bears little relation to the Narrator's perspective. The Country Mouse sees her experience
predominantly in its existential dimension-namely one of survival and tradeoffs. The Narrator is the one who elevates the experience of the mice to
mythic significance wherein tragedy can potentially exist for both mice,
though in the case of this fable tragedy is averted by luck and pragmatic reasoning. But consider the Burgess Mouse, whose whole existence can be seen
as a deliberate cat and mouse game with death. Herein lies the tragic
grandeur!
Another fable where the Narrator's superimposition of myth comes into
play is "The Fox and the Wolf." The Fox's confession and judgment exist
within a human code of religious conduct which is antithetical to the necessities of a fox's survival. Again, this tale illustrates that the inescapable demands of the flesh take precedence in the mortal realm. We may even see
through the Fox's example, in the violation of the Christian values, that such
religious doctrine of fasting and diet is a perversion of natural and biological
necessity, reflecting utter contempt for those biological needs. The Fox IS
confession raises serious questions about what sin really is. In his case, his
criminality is intimately tied to that which lets him survive. The Lenten
fasting, for the Fox, appears to be totally unnatural to the point where it becomes comically ridiculous when we consider a fox trying to fish or mockingly baptizing a kid so that it can be called a salmon. The fasting is for him
an aberration of the needs of his nature, and as the tale indicates, need may
have no law.
The Narrator's adherence to myth embodies in addition to religious values social myths as well. For instance, in the case of "The Wolf and the
Wether," as I mentioned earlier, the central issues can be seen as corruption
and self-delusion which eventually lead to tragic insights into the truth about
the self. In the moralitas the Narrator, in typically conservative choric fashion, urges that humanity therefore maintain the bounds of propriety within
the social sphere. In other words, the status quo should be upheld, and this
5Murtaugh, p. 419.
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is the key to avoiding the upset of social order that leads to the Wether's destruction.
Frequently, the social and the religious themes intertwine themselves.
For instance, the Lamb in "The Wolf and the Lamb" believes in an external,
rational force in the universe to which a being may appeal in seeking justice.
As it says, "nature will me defend" (I. 2644) when the Wolf accuses it of
polluting the stream (the Lamb, remember, was down-stream from the Wolf
and "logically" could not have fouled the Wolf's drinking water). However,
the logical laws of nature offer no defense. The Wolf simply refuses to accept them. Nature here, like the God in "The Sheep and the Dog," is seemingly asleep and won't come to the rescue of the Lamb. The assumed rationallaws of nature, and any mythic dimensions perceived therein, may fmally
be arbitrary when viewed from the tragic perspective, as the Wolf's dismissal
of the Lamb's arguments implies. The tragic element in the Lamb's case is
that all the myths, religious and cultural, fail him precisely because the Wolf
will not accept their premises. The truth here is all relative.
The moral for this fable is both social and religious. The Lamb represents the poor, oppressed masses, and the Wolf represents the agents of oppression. The Narrator claims that hell's fIre will be the eternal reward for
the human wolves' injustices inflicted upon the poor. Here again, the Narrator seeks the consolation of myth in an attempt to make sense out of what,
in the absence of such a socio-religious perspective, can be viewed as nothing
but bleak, senseless, existential horror. The moralitas here raises an important consideration for Henryson' s general treatment of the tragic dimension
of human existence, namely, to use Chaucer's Monk's famous question,
"How shall the world be served?" In "The Wolf and the Lamb" Henryson
attacks the ruling class's unjust treatment of the poor, their perversions of
law, the abuse of power, their avarice. In a direct address to landlords (ll.
2756 ff.) the Narrator pleas for mercy toward the poor, telling the rich and
powerful to beware of their souls. Here, the world should be served by an
adherence to the religious values and the social values which derive from
them.
The social dimension of Henryson' s tragic vision receives its clearest and
most comprehensive treatment in "The Lion and the Mouse." Henryson' s
source, Aesop, tells this fable within the framing device of a dream vision,
and the tale is the most potentially topical of any of Henryson' s fables. It is
certainly the most socio-political of the fables and also proposes an answer to
the question of how the world shall be served. 6 Aesop, particularly in his
6The potential topicality could even reflect Heruyson's own despondence over particular current events in his clay. However, this is by no means certain. See for instance Marshall Stearns, Robert Henryson (New York, 1949) esp. ch, 2, and Robert L. Kindrick, "Uon
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prologue to the tale, reflects in generalized tenns about worldly woe and the
human condition. He is primarily concerned not with the transcendent realities, but rather with the state of humanity within the mortal realm. His poetic eye is directed at the world we all inhabit.
In lines 1398-1403, Henryson's Narrator asks for a moral fable from his
ancient and revered master in a manner which echoes Chaucer's Host's plea
to the Monk for a moral tale in the vein of Chaucer's recently completed tale
of Melibee. Henryson's Narrator here seems to be seeking moral consolation, perhaps in the face of the bleakness of Aesop's other fables which the
Narrator nominally has been translating. However, the Narrator doesn't get
what he wants, just as Harry Bailly gets instead of a moral tale the Monk's
series of tragedies in which an ultimate scheme of justice is a dubious proposition. Aesop's moralitas focuses attention away from the cosmic and mythic
and places this attention squarely on the mortal realm. In the moral there is
no ultimate justice (as the moralitas of "The Sheep and the Dog" might want
to suggest). He thus provides one possible answer to Chaucer's Monk's
question of how the world shall be served by pointing out the necessity for
rulers to be good governors, to exercise control and pity. Otherwise, a ruler
who wallows in worldly lust and vain pleasure (II. 1602-4) may fmd himself
overthrown, his fortunes turned. Aesop's moral offers a fonnula for establishing and maintaining the hannony of man's social existence. The consolation here is ultimately of this world, not of the next.
In contrast to this fable, the sheep of "The Sheep and the Dog" casts its
eyes and its prayers heavenward, but to no avail. In this tale, the Wolf
threatens the Sheep with excommunication (II. 1156-7) if a certain debt is not
paid. Presumably this action of excommunication would detennine the
Sheep's ability to fmd salvation in heaven or damnation in hell (assuming, of
course, that the Wolf's authority and power are somehow genuine). At least
this is what seems to be motivating the Sheep's compliance with the verdict
against him (II. 1245 ff.). But, we may well ask, why should the Sheep seek
salvation through a religious system (if that's what it is) that is capable of
such gross injustice? Is the assumption that the system, despite its corruption, is the only key to heaven? I think so, for at least nominally Henryson
calls into question religious figures, not religion itself. I say "nominally"
here because the undercurrent of the fable with its comatose God potentially

or Cat? Henryson's Characterization of James ill," SSL, 14 (1979), 123-36. At best, the
case for political topicality is dubious, as pointed out by R. J. Lyall, "Politics and Poetry in
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Scotland," Scottish Literary Journal, 3 (1976), 5-29). In
my article, "Legends of James ill and the Problem of Henryson's Political Topicality," SU,
17 (1990), 15-20), I show how sixteenth-century legendary histories of James ill contribute
to what I feel is the inappropriate superimposition of legends onto Henryson' s fables.
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casts a demythologizing pall over the religious system as well when viewed
from the tragic, as opposed to the choric, perspective.
In terms of the mythic consolation offered by the fable, we are told that
the tyrannical oppressors hope to maintain the status quo and in doing so will
go to hell as a result. We might even say that from this perspective the
Sheep's acquiescence to the unjust verdict against him is partially necessary
for the damnation of the unjust. At least this seems to be the Narrator's
choric sentiment. Yet this sentiment is counterbalanced by the Sheep's bleak
existential condition vis-a-vis the cosmos and the unresponsive God. The
consolation of myth here offers a way to resolve the question of justice raised
in the fable, yet in the fable itself the Sheep complains bitterly and to no
avail to the heavens about his victimization, echoing the Book of Job. He
also only obeys the court's order out of fear for other and what he thinks are
more severe forms of punishment. So he projects his misery, its cause and
continuance, onto what he concludes is a sleeping God who cares not about
earthly injustice. Yet even the bleakness of this vision for the Sheep carries
with it an element of consolation for him. It absolves him of having to face
any responsibility he might otherwise feel for the choices that have led him
to his own plight, or what is even a grimmer prospect, that there really is no
justice at all operative in the cosmos, that the mortal and divine realms may
be forever isolated and estranged. But such is not the case. The Sheep finally accepts Christian doctrine and the meaning it can provide-namely that
the victims are to blame for their suffering in the sense that it is punishment
for wrong-doing, and that the cosmos does hold out the possibility of an ultimate justice, obscure as it may appear to faulty mortal reasoning. 7 In the
end, the Sheep is pitiful because he won't or can't rise to the height of a
tragic figure even though he is caught up in a potentially tragic situation. He
won't follow through the implications (tragic and horrifying as they are) of
his question about a sleeping God and its result for the cosmos. In the end
he instead prays to this God for salvation, which is what the Sheep wants
above all else and which is why he tolerates such gross and blatant injustice
perpetrated against him. He is decidedly not a Captain Ahab or a Miltonic
Satan.
The bleakness hovering over this fable like a pestilent fog informs other
fables as well, and here we may briefly turn to some of the other manifestations of this tragic element. For instance, if we return to "The Preaching of
the Swallow" for a moment we fmd a wholly spiritual fable with an equally

7 Yet paradoxically, the selection of the "guilty" victim here requires the selection of an
"innocent" victim; thus the selection process is revealed to be entirely arbitrary. This paradoxical quality of selecting a scapegoat as a victim is given detailed coverage in Rene Girard,
The Scapegoat, tr. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, 1986), esp. ch. 3.
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spiritual moral wherein the Narrator tells us human reason is blinded by the
emotional faculties. Similarly, in the prologue to the tale the Narrator views
reason as being deficient in its capacity to understand God. Reason, at least
for the Narrator, thus functions as a key to salvation; in other words, it is the
key to knowing the self in relation to the divine scheme of things. It does
not, however, necessarily mean a direct and full understanding of that
scheme or the self. Nor does this scheme, when viewed in light of some of
the other fables, seem entirely consistent. Various fox and wolf figures are
condemned for their thieving from human beings. Yet in "The Preaching of
the Swallow" the birds are condemned precisely for not having the good
sense to rob the Fowler of his seed and crops when they have the chance to
do so. When looked at in this way, the Narrator's moral absolutes seem to
be ultimately relative to time, place, and circumstance. The birds may be
condemned for their actions (or inactions) when seen from the perspective of
the moralitas, yet with a slight change of perspective the birds might also be
condemned had they in fact destroyed the Fowler's flax crop.S
The bleakness of this fable and the vision of existence it portrays is
countered by the Narrator's reliance on religious thought as a way of explaining away the existential horror implicit and explicit in the tale he tells.
Curiously, this fable rationalizes the action both in a prologue as well as in
the moral. The moral itself turns out to be a rationalization about rationality
and its relation to saving the soul. The prologue, on the other hand, questions the ultimate validity of reason in its capacity to understand God and the
nature of the cosmos. If, as the prologue claims, God is only partially
knowable, and that through His reflection in His creations, then the tale of
the birds does not necessarily reflect a God that is "gude, fair, wyis, and
beniog" as the Narrator claims in the prologue (1. 1652). 9 So in this fable
too the choric Narrator relies on the consolation of myth in both Prologue
and moralitas. Of course, another possibility presented by the fable is the issue raised in "The Sheep and the Dog"-that God is asleep and exerts no
control, good or bad, over human existence. Yet that possibility is one our
Narrator cannot and will not accept.

SThis relativity of perspective in the fable is implicit in J. A. Burrow's remark: "Even
the fowler, whose activities are so ominous from the point of view of the birds, delights the
narrator" ("Heruyson: The Preaching of the Swallow," Essays in Criticism, 25 (1975), 26.
9In fact, as Daniel Murtaugh has noted: "... the God of plenitude and universal design
threatens to tum chimeric or downright wicked as our theories confront a cosmos whose indifference or hostility to us is only too clear. So, in our disappointment, we tum to the other
God who repudiates our rationalizations, whose benevolence is preserved for us at the cost of
his intelligibility" (p. 407).
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A similarly grim and bleak fable is the last one, "The Paddock and the
Mouse. " Here, too, the Narrator's adherence to the religious interpretation
of the action is all that keeps the tragic and existential horror of the tale's
implications at bay. Reason here, as in "The Wolf and the Lamb," can potentially be seen as meaningless. The soul's "reasonableness" and the body's
"lawlessness" struggle, perhaps to a draw, and death comes swooping down
to devour all, potentially rendering meaningless the struggle between body
and soul in the river of life (the Paddock's natural environment), except that
the soul is the Narrator's device by which to attempt to f'md meaning here.
I have concluded with these two fables, "The Preaching of the Swallow"
and "The Paddock and the Mouse," because they pose the fundamental
problem of the relation of the soul to the body through the mythological apparatus with which the choric Narrator attempts to make sense out of the potentially senseless. The tragic condition in "The Paddock and the Mouse," as
the Narrator explains it, is that the soul may not be parted from the body (l.
2950). By def'mition in the Christian context, and as indicated by the Narrator in the General Prologue to the Fables, the body is corrupt and endowed
with a soul that can all too easily become corrupt through giving in to the
body's dictates-and as we know, need may have no law. The only solution
for the soul, then, is reflected by the Narrator's contempt for human carnality: govern the corporeal needs with a spiritual, doctrinal law even though
this governance creates displeasure, discomfort, and perhaps even destruction
of the flesh. Yet when we tum to "The Preaching of the Swallow," the Narrator claims that the tragic root of all human misery and suffering is,
paradoxically, the partition of the body and soul. Since the body wields the
ultimate power in the mortal realm it is not governed by the soul. The mortal and the spiritual here are forever estranged, and this very estrangement is
seen to be the cause of the soul's inability to govern the body.
So, if we listen to the Narrator, the tragic human condition results from
two things-the soul's separation from the body, and the soul's lack of separation from the body. Can the Narrator have it both ways? Possibly. Without a reliance on mythic concepts of God, the soul, religious doctrine, and
social organization, the vision of this carnal reality in many of the fables is
one of unrelieved, meaningless bleakness and horror. Yet the mythic dimension simultaneously makes the tragic dimension possible because the tragic
figure must exist in distinct relation to some system of order that he or she
violates. By placing interpretations in mythic contexts, moreover, Henryson's Narrator attempts to make human existence, if not less bleak, at least
a bit more tolerable because meaningful. In other words, the tragic dimension of the fables, grim as it is, affirms some fundamental value of existence.
The choric sentiments of the Narrator lend validity to the governing cultural
and religious myths by drawing the implicit comparison of what the meaning
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of life would be without them-a vision of existence where life and nature
have no mythological dimension, where there is no metaphysical anchor,
where there is nothing but pointless suffering and horror.
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